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DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
WHY STATE FARM WON’T BE THE LAST WORD 
Laura J. Hines* 
During the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided 
no fewer than seven cases in which it was asked to overturn punitive 
damage awards on a variety of constitutional grounds.1 Over the course 
of these decisions, the Due Process Clause has clearly emerged as the 
norm favored by the Court to test the procedures utilized by courts in 
imposing punitive damages, to evaluate the appropriateness of awarding 
such damages, and to calibrate the correct size of the award in a 
particular case.2 
The tightening of constitutional constraints on the legitimacy and 
permissible size of the punitive damage awards follows a well-
established pattern of federal oversight of state court decision-making 
that began shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.3 In its 
examination of state punitive damage awards, as with its prior pattern of 
due process inquiries, the Court first addressed purely procedural 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas.  My sincerest thanks to Chris 
Drahozal, Rob Glicksman, John Lungstrum and David Partlett for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.  Thanks, too, to the University of Kansas for its generous research support. 
 1. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 2. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 559; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages 
(With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2087 (1998) (“Hence a 
majority of recent Justices . . . have argued that the Due Process Clause requires constraints on jury 
discretion that will provide fair notice to potential defendants and limit the role of arbitrary or 
irrelevant factors.”). 
 3. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  Justice Field’s expansive views of the 
procedural and substantive limits the Due Process Clause imposes upon state authority marked the 
start of a long and somewhat tortured tradition of Supreme Court intervention into the details of 
state court processes and decisions.  Modern decisions reviewing state actions for due process 
violations commonly employ a balancing analysis under the rubric of fundamental fairness. 
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concerns,4 then advanced into a substantive consideration of the 
constitutional adequacy of the principles or standards which cabin the 
discretion state courts exercise in reaching their punitive damages 
determinations.5 
Although the primary purposes they serve may have changed over 
time, the functions of punitive damages today are commonly agreed to 
be the punishment and deterrence of extraordinarily wrongful, willful 
conduct that is variously characterized as malicious, outrageous, wanton, 
fraudulent or in deliberate disregard of the interests of others.6  For 
almost all of the 125 years since the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, punitive damages were regarded as so firmly imbedded in 
American legal culture that no special procedures or precise rules of law 
were deemed necessary to constrain state courts’ imposition of such 
“exemplary” damages.7  This laissez faire attitude toward possible 
constitutional infirmities of state law and procedures regarding punitive 
damages has rapidly been abandoned by the Supreme Court over the 
past fifteen years,8 and a new paradigm, governing state court punitive 
damages awards and federal review of them, is in the process of being 
established.9 
Positing that punitive damages today are more frequent and much 
 
 4. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1 (examining procedures by which the trial court awarded 
punitive damages and the appellate courts reviewed punitive damages). 
 5. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 559; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2087 (noting that “a 
majority of the Supreme Court has converged” on the proposition that punitive damages awards 
unconstitutionally violate the “substantive dimension” of the Due Process Clause “when they are 
grossly excessive”). 
 6. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). But see Anthony J. Sebok, What 
Did Punitive Damages Do?  Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters 
Today, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 163, 163-64 (2003) (noting the “variety of plausible purposes” for 
punitive damages, including compensation); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: 
Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1994) (explaining that “[a]lthough 
most courts refer only to ‘punishment’ and ‘deterrence’ as rationales for [punitive] damages, this 
masks the variety of specific functions that punitive damages actually serve,” including such 
additional functions as education, compensation and law enforcement). 
 7. As a long-established part of the common law of torts, due process was thought to inhere 
in punitive damage awards because of the fact that the state practices and procedures for awarding 
punitive damages in appropriate cases antedated the inclusion of the Due Process Clause in the Bill 
of Rights and its subsequent application to state actions through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 32-34 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 8. See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process: A Tale 
of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 483 (decrying the “conspicuous absen[ce]” of any Court 
“deference to historical practice and legislative prerogatives” in its punitive damages due process 
jurisprudence). 
 9. See Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2093 (presciently describing the post-BMW  “project 
of creating a detailed form of ‘constitutional common law’ to control punitive damages” that the 
Court might embark upon and, in any event, has “practically force[d] lower courts to begin to do”). 
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larger than in the recent past,10 the Court has repeatedly found it 
necessary to remind states of the unique nature of punitive damages and 
the heightened care with which such awards must be imposed.11  Unlike 
compensatory damages, which serve to “redress the concrete loss” 
suffered by the plaintiff, punitive damages operate as “quasi-criminal” 
fines12 imposed without the protections to which a defendant would be 
entitled in any criminal proceeding.13 
While acknowledging states’ legitimate authority to award such 
damages,14 the Court has nevertheless developed increasingly exacting 
due process standards by which courts must assess punitive damages 
awards.  Its most recent pronouncements on this subject, in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, reflect a Court doggedly 
determined to constrain state punitive damages awards.  State Farm 
significantly curtails the scope of defendant conduct that a state may 
subject to punitive liability, and pointedly clarifies the rigorous three-
guidepost analysis the Court set forth in its landmark decision in BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 15 offering highly structured guidance on 
the outer limits of punitive damages awards.16 
Part I of this article will trace the development of the evolving 
principles and requirements the Court is imposing on state awards of 
punitive damages, identifying notable undercurrents within the Court 
regarding this new and expanding application of the Due Process Clause.  
Part II will present a detailed analysis of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
 
 10. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982). 
 11. The Court has reversed or vacated the last four punitive damages cases it has considered.  
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance 
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]ime and again, this Court and 
its Members have expressed concern about punitive damages awards ‘run wild,’ inexplicable on any 
basis but caprice or passion.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 
YALE L.J. 347, 352 (2003). 
 12. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
 13. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520 (“Although [punitive damages] awards serve the same 
purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not 
been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.  This increases our concerns over 
the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered.”). 
 14. See id.; BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a 
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”). 
 15. BMW, 517 U.S. at 559.  The three guideposts enumerated by the Court were: 1) “the 
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,” id. at 575; 2) the awards “ratio to the actual 
harm inflicted on the plaintiff,” id. at 580; and 3)  a comparison of the “punitive damages award and 
the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct,” id. at 583. 
 16. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513; see also infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text. 
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Insurance Co. v. Campbell, which represents the Court’s most ambitious 
attempt yet to provide guidance to states on how to approach the 
imposition of punitive damages and how to assess the appropriate size 
thereof.  Finally, Part III of this article will examine recent lower court 
cases involving contested punitive damage awards as a means to identify 
and discuss several important issues left unresolved by State Farm.  
These issues include the relative significance of the “reprehensibility” 
factors, determining the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages, the relevance of a defendant’s wealth in calculating punitive 
damages, and the aggregate punishment problem. 
I. SUPREME COURT PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE  
PRE-STATE FARM 
In 1989, the Court first signaled its willingness to consider due 
process limitations on punitive damages in Browning-Ferris Industries 
of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.17  While Browning-Ferris rejected 
the argument that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
applied in the context of punitive damages awards,18 the Court expressly 
reserved for future examination the argument that a state’s imposition of 
punitive damages awards may violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19 
In 1991, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip, the Court for 
the first time squarely addressed a due process challenge to a punitive 
damages award.20  Acknowledging that the Due Process Clause does 
indeed impose substantive constraints on the amount of punitive 
damages, the Court nevertheless concluded that the specific award at 
issue was neither excessive nor arbitrarily imposed.21 The Haslip 
opinion was devoted primarily to an assessment of the procedural 
protections Alabama had in place to guard against excessive or arbitrary 
punitive damages awards.22  As for excessiveness, the Court found that 
 
 17. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 18. Id. at 263-64.  Several scholars have contended that the Excessive Fines Clause ought to 
apply to such awards.  See, e.g., Stephen R. McAllister, A Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth 
Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 761 (1995).  This is particularly relevant in 
light of the “quasi-criminal” nature of punitive damages.  See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A 
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 151 (1986). 
 19. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277; see also id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that the Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris “leaves the door open” for future due 
process challenges). 
 20. Pacific Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991). 
 21. Id. at 23. 
 22. The Court cited in particular Alabama’s judicial review process, which “ensures that 
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the four-to-one (4:1) ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
reflected by the award at issue placed it “close to the line” of 
constitutional propriety, but passed constitutional muster.23 
Two years after Haslip, the Court considered yet another due 
process challenge to a punitive damages award.  In TXO Production 
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court approved a punitive 
damages award even more disproportionately related to the amount of 
compensatory damages.24  In approving the award’s 526:1 ratio, the 
Court interpreted its proportionality analysis to permit state courts to 
consider not only the actual harm caused as a result of defendant’s 
conduct but also the “potential harm” to plaintiff, and even the “possible 
harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior 
were not deterred.”25  The Court upheld the award in TXO because of 
such potential harm, finding that if the defendant’s fraudulent scheme 
had succeeded, the plaintiffs would have suffered far greater economic 
harm.26 
Justice O’Connor wrote a lengthy and scathing dissenting opinion 
in TXO, decrying the Court’s abandonment of its promise in Haslip “that 
punitive damages awards would receive sufficient constitutional 
scrutiny” to protect against excessive or arbitrary awards.27  In 
particular, Justice O’Connor rebuked the Court for its failure to provide 
adequate guidance in determining the excessiveness of a punitive 
damages award, and its refusal to identify even “a single guidepost to 
help other courts find their way through [an] area”28 so lacking in 
“objective criteria.”29  Justice O’Connor’s dissent offered several such 
criteria on the question of excessiveness,30 including “the relationship 
between the punitive damages award and compensatory damages,” and 
comparison of the award to legislatively designated penalties and to 
 
punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have 
some understandable relationship to compensatory damages.”  Id. at 22. 
 23. Id. at 23. 
 24. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993). 
 25. Id. at 460. 
 26. Id. at 462.  The Court also found significant the fact that TXO’s conduct toward the 
plaintiffs was “part of a larger pattern of fraud” affecting others.  Id. 
 27. Id. at 472-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  In Justice O’Connor’s view, the “monstrous[ly]” 
excessive award in TXO was directly attributable to the prejudicial use at trial of evidence 
demonstrating TXO’s tremendous wealth, compounded by an emphasis on its status as a non-
resident corporation.  Id. at 493. 
 28. Id. at 480. 
 29. Id. at 483. 
 30. TXO, 509 U.S. at 481. 
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other punitive damages awards for similar conduct.”31 
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the next foray into the world of 
punitive damages, the Court struck down a provision of the Oregon 
Constitution that prohibited judicial review of the excessiveness of a 
punitive damages awards unless the reviewing court found “no evidence 
to support any punitive damages at all.”32  The Court held that the Due 
Process Clause required meaningful judicial review of punitive damages 
awards, emphasizing the crucial safeguarding function judicial review 
serves in protecting defendants against the “acute danger of arbitrary 
deprivation of property.”33 
Only two years later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the 
Court for the first time reversed an award of punitive damages on the 
ground that it was unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process 
Clause, and articulated a three-part excessiveness analysis for lower 
courts to follow.34  Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained 
that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide defendants 
adequate notice not only of the conduct that might subject them to 
liability for punitive damages, but also the severity of any penalty 
imposed as a result of that conduct.35  A state’s failure to provide such 
notice, resulting in an unconstitutionally excessive punitive damages 
award, can be established by analysis of three “guideposts” set forth in 
the Court’s opinion.36  The first (and most important) guidepost requires 
courts to evaluate “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.”37  The second guidepost focuses on the ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages, seeking to ensure some degree of 
proportionality.38  The final excessiveness guidepost compares the 
 
 31. Id.  With respect to the Court’s potential harm rationale for approving the “shockingly” 
disproportionate award, Justice O’Connor warned that interpreting “potential harm” to include harm 
to all possible present and future victims threatens to render meaningless any constraint on punitive 
damages.  Id. at 484-85 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Virtually any tort, however, can cause millions 
of dollars of harm if imposed against a sufficient number of victims.”).  In any event, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that the potential harm rationale could not sustain the award at issue because 
neither the jury nor the lower courts had meaningfully considered it.  Id. 
 32. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1994). 
 33. Id. at 432.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Oberg on the 
ground that Oregon’s judicial review procedures did not violate “the due process limits indicated in 
Haslip and TXO.”  Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 34. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 35. Id. at 574. 
 36. Two of these “guideposts” bear more than a little resemblance to the “objective criteria” 
Justice O’Connor urged courts to consider in her TXO dissent.  See supra notes 29-31 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 38. Id. at 581. 
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amount of punitive damages to any “civil or criminal penalties that could 
be imposed for comparable misconduct.”39 
In BMW, Alabama had imposed the $2 million punitive damages 
award at issue against BMW for its failure to disclose to a plaintiff that 
his car had been repainted prior to its sale.  As an initial matter, Justice 
Stevens addressed the scope of defendant conduct that a state may 
legitimately seek to punish through an award of punitive damages.  The 
jury in BMW, according to Justice Stevens, had improperly calculated 
the punitive damages award on the basis of harm to every purchaser 
nationwide who BMW failed to inform of the pre-sale repainting – even 
though such nondisclosure was expressly lawful in many states.40  
Justice Stevens emphasized the constitutional significance of the trial 
court’s error: “We think it follows from these principles of state 
sovereignty and comity that . . . Alabama does not have the power . . . to 
punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had 
no impact on Alabama or its residents.”41  The Court left for another day, 
however, the question of whether a state may base a punitive damages 
award on unlawful conduct in other states.42 
While acknowledging that the Alabama Supreme Court had already 
limited the punitive damages award to punish BMW only for its conduct 
in Alabama (remitting the award from $4 million to $2 million), the 
Court held that even the remitted amount violated due process, 
concluding that the excessiveness of the award could be demonstrated 
under all three guideposts.  First, with respect to reprehensibility, the 
Court found it significant that BMW’s conduct was lawful in other states 
and had not been determined to be unlawful before the plaintiff’s case.  
This indicated a low degree of culpability compared to a defendant who 
knowingly and repeatedly engaged in wrongful activity.  Further, 
BMW’s conduct resulted in purely economic harm and did not threaten 
the health or safety of its consumers, all of which suggested a lower 
degree of reprehensibility.43 
Next, while the Court described the ratio analysis as a “significant” 
part of the excessiveness equation with a “long pedigree,” it declined to 
set any definite ratio by which to evaluate punitive damage awards: 
“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line 
 
 39. Id. at 583. 
 40. Id. at 572. 
 41. Id. at 572-73; see id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that punitive 
damages award could not be based on out of state conduct). 
 42. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 n.20; see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
 43. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-80. 
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[between acceptable and unacceptable ratios] is marked by a simple 
mathematical formula.”44  The ratio of a “breathtaking” 500:1 ($2 
million in punitive damages compared to $4,000 in compensatory 
damages) in the case at hand, however, led the Court to “raise a 
suspicious judicial eyebrow.”45  Further, the Court found none of the 
circumstances that might justify such a high ratio to be present in 
plaintiff’s case.46 
In a frustratingly inexact footnote alluding to others harmed by 
BMW’s conduct, the Court opined that even if the plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages could be extrapolated to each of the 14 Alabama 
consumers affected by BMW’s nondisclosure ($4,000 x 14 = $56,000), 
the resulting ratio of punitive damages to total Alabama harm would still 
be an (apparently) unacceptable 35:1.47  Such reasoning failed to shed 
any helpful light on the highly contentious subject of punitive damages 
in the context of conduct that affects a large number of people, as in 
mass torts.48 
As in TXO, the Court acknowledged that a proper evaluation of the 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages may require 
consideration of the harm that did not but might have resulted from 
defendant’s conduct, referred to as the “potential” harm to the victim.49  
In BMW, however, the $4,000 compensatory damages awarded to the 
plaintiff for diminution of the value of his repainted car represented the 
only possible harm he could have sustained as a result of BMW’s 
conduct.  Although the Court in BMW also alluded to the fact that no 
“other BMW purchaser was threatened with any additional potential 
harm,”50 it did not refer to the broader language of TXO that suggested 
consideration of “possible harm to other victims that might have resulted 
 
 44. Id. at 582; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2092 (concluding that after BMW, 
“striking ratios are not (and should not be) decisive” in determining excessiveness of a punitive 
damages award). 
 45. Id. at 583. 
 46. Id. at 582.  Such high ratios might be tolerated, the Court explained, “if, for example, a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,” or where “the 
injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of the noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
determine.”  Id. 
 47. Id.  at 582 n.35.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer repeatedly refers to $56,000 as 
the relevant amount of “past, present, or likely future harm” caused by BMW’s conduct.  Id. at 589-
90 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 48. See infra notes 189-198 and accompanying text. 
 49. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 460 (1993)). 
 50. Id. at 582. 
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if similar future behavior were not deterred.”51 
Finally, in its application of the third guidepost, the Court in BMW 
considered the $2,000 civil penalty that Alabama could have imposed 
based on BMW’s conduct, and noted that similar penalties in other states 
reached only $10,000.  In light of these statutes, the Court concluded 
that neither Alabama nor any other state had provided “an out-of-state 
distributor with fair notice that the first violation – or, indeed, the first 14 
violations – of its provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion 
dollar penalty.”52 
BMW thus announced a three-guidepost test for excessiveness, 
albeit in the context of a case the Court considered quite easy.53  
Virtually none of the aggravating reprehensibility factors were present, 
the ratio of 500:1 was astonishingly high without any of the historically 
mitigating circumstances, and the comparable civil penalties Alabama 
might have imposed suggested the award was “tantamount to a severe 
criminal penalty” imposed without fair notice to BMW.54 
Dissenting from the Court’s decision, Justice Scalia railed against 
what he regarded as the illegitimate federalization of “yet another aspect 
of our Nation’s legal culture (no matter how much in need of correction 
it may be).”55  The Due Process Clause only guarantees “an opportunity 
to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state court; but 
there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable.”56  
Moreover, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s guidepost analysis as 
offering no actual guidance at all.57 
Justice Ginsburg also dissented in BMW, arguing that the Court 
“unnecessarily and unwisely ventures [further] into territory traditionally 
within the States’ domain.”58  Rightly predicting the Court’s need to 
revisit this subject, Justice Ginsburg strenuously objected to the Court’s 
 
 51. TXO, 509 U.S. at 460. 
 52. BMW, 517 U.S. at 584. 
 53. See Klein, supra note 8, at 484 (criticizing BMW for “holding that somehow the Court 
knows a grossly excessive punitive damage award when it sees one”). 
 54. The Court also warned that excessive punitive damages awards “implicate[] the federal 
interest in preventing individual States from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce” by 
using “the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire 
Nation.” Id. at 585. 
 55. BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 606 (“The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that 
does not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does nothing at all except confer an 
artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award 
of punitive damages was not ‘fair.’”). 
 58. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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ill-conceived commitment to occasionally “correct” a state court’s 
“misapplication” of BMW’s vaguely articulated guideposts.59 
The Court’s opinion in BMW indeed left open several questions for 
lower courts to consider.60  It failed to explore fully the scope of 
defendant conduct a state may legitimately punish, both in the state 
(harm to people other than the plaintiff) and outside the state (where 
defendant’s out-of-state conduct is unlawful).61  Moreover, because the 
Court found the award at issue to be dramatically excessive under each 
guidepost, BMW offered little guidance on how to resolve harder cases.  
For example, how high may a punitive damages award be when the 
conduct at issue implicates the more serious reprehensibility factors 
(such as indifference to health and safety),62 and what ratio short of 
500:1 will raise the Court’s suspicious eyebrow?63 
In the Court’s next case, Cooper Industries, Inc.  v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., it had little opportunity to address any of these 
questions.64  Rather, the Court “reiterated the importance” of its BMW 
guideposts by “mandat[ing] appellate courts to conduct de novo review 
 
 59. Id. at 612. 
 60. See Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2092 (“After BMW, and the unruly precedents on 
which it is based, the law governing constitutional constraints on punitive damage awards is in a 
state of considerable uncertainty and flux.”); David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What 
Information Should Jurors Be Given to Determine the Amount of a Punitive Damage Award?, 57 
MD. L. REV. 174, 213 (1998) (pointing out that BMW “only sets limits upon the states’ abilities to 
assess punitive damages,” and “does not tell us the best way for a state to go about the specific 
business of computing them”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Court’s Backwards 
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and 
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1283-84 (2000) (criticizing as overly 
broad the “flexibility of the BMW test [that] permits lower courts to ignore some guideposts . . . and 
create others guideposts, such as the defendant’s wealth”). 
 61. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
 62. Courts after BMW grappled with the relative degree of a defendant’s reprehensibility in 
cases involving conduct allegedly reflecting disregard for the health and safety of others.  See, e.g., 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (discussing asbestos 
manufacturer’s failure to warn of known health risks posed by product); Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 513 (Ky. 2002) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (finding Ford’s 
manufacture of allegedly defective transmissions, that resulted in a wrongful death action, 
insufficiently reprehensible to justify punitive damages award); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 
461, 484 (6th Cir. 2002) (Nelson, J., dissenting in part) (doubting whether sufficiently reprehensible 
conduct could be shown by Chrysler’s “recklessness in failing to equip the truck with a door latch 
that would have spared [the plaintiff] the inconvenience of buckling his seatbelt”); Romo v. Ford 
Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 165-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding $290 million punitive 
damages award, in part, because Ford’s “malicious conduct” “placed tens of thousands of lives at 
risk and actually claimed three such lives in the present case”). 
 63. See Gershowitz, supra note 60, at 1283-84 (2000) (contending that BMW’s “failure to 
announce a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages permits lower courts to make up 
any ratio they see fit”). 
 64. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
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of a trial court’s application of them to the jury’s award.”65  In an 
interesting and somewhat controversial holding, the court ruled that de 
novo appellate review was appropriate because a jury verdict on the 
appropriateness and size of a punitive damage award was not a factual 
determination for purposes of requiring a deferential review.66 
Justice Stevens, writing again for the majority as he did in BMW, 
also briefly addressed several indicia of the award’s excessiveness.67  
First, the jury had been improperly instructed regarding the 
wrongfulness of some aspects of the defendant’s conduct that were in 
fact lawful.  The Court urged the appellate court on remand to consider 
the extent to which the jury’s (and trial court’s) assessment of 
reprehensibility might have been improperly predicated on lawful 
conduct.68  Second, the Court cautioned the appellate court to re-
examine the trial court’s reliance on evidence regarding the “potential 
harm [the plaintiff] would have suffered had [the defendant] succeeded 
in its wrongful conduct,” describing the trial court’s assessment of that 
harm as “unrealistic.”69  Finally, the Court expressed doubt as to whether 
the defendant’s conduct would have warranted multiple assessments of 
the relevant state sanction under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, 
rather than a single statutory penalty of $25,000.70 
II.  EXPANDING THE BMW EXCESSIVENESS TEST: STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY V. CAMPBELL 
In State Farm, the Court returned once again to the task of 
enforcing due process limitations on punitive damages awards, striking 
down a $145 million punitive damages award.  In light of the numerous 
errors committed by the Utah Supreme Court in its interpretation of 
BMW’s guideposts, the Court in State Farm endeavored to provide 
 
 65. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003) (describing 
the significance of Cooper). 
 66. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437-41; see also Sebok, supra note 6, at 179-80 (discussing and 
critiquing this rationale). 
 67. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 441 (suggesting that its “own consideration of each of the three 
[BMW] factors reveals a series of questionable conclusions by the District Court that may not 
survive de novo review”). 
 68. Id. at 441. 
 69. Id. at 442. 
 70. Id.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit indeed remitted the punitive damages award from $4.5 
million to $500,000, based on its assessment that Cooper’s conduct was “more foolish than 
reprehensible”; the 90:1 ratio was “only somewhat less ‘breathtaking’” than the one struck down in 
BMW and the potential harm evidence was speculative; and Cooper’s conduct would only have 
resulted in a single, modest penalty.  Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 
1146, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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additional guidance regarding its due process excessiveness test. 
Plaintiffs’ claims against State Farm, their insurance company, 
stemmed from its mishandling of a lawsuit brought against Mr. 
Campbell by two drivers in a head-on collision allegedly caused by Mr. 
Campbell’s negligence.71  Representing Mr. Campbell, State Farm 
declined offers to settle these claims for the insurance policy limits 
despite a widely shared consensus that Mr. Campbell was indeed 
responsible for the accident.  Moreover, State Farm assured the 
Campbells throughout that “their assets were safe, that they had no 
liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent their 
interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel.”72 
After a jury verdict against Mr. Campbell for almost $200,000 more 
than the settlement offers, however, State Farm refused to pay the full 
judgment because it was $135,000 in excess of Mr. Campbell’s 
insurance policy limits.73  Most damning, State Farm’s counsel told 
plaintiffs to “put for sale signs on your property,” even though State 
Farm had promised them it would protect their assets.74  While State 
Farm ultimately paid the entire amount, the Campbells sued the 
insurance company for bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
At trial, the Campbells introduced extensive evidence of State 
Farm’s nationwide policies and practices, urging the jury to punish State 
Farm for “what it’s doing across the country.”75  Indeed, in addition to 
awarding the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages (which 
the trial court remitted to $1 million),76 the jury also awarded $145 
million in punitive damages (which the trial court remitted to $25 
million).77 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court’s application of the BMW 
guideposts led it to reinstate the jury’s $145 million award of punitive 
damages.  The Utah Supreme Court cited the high degree of 
reprehensibility reflected in State Farm’s nationwide conduct, the need 
 
 71. Mr. Campbell, driving with his wife on a two-lane highway, made an unsafe pass into 
oncoming traffic, causing the driver of a car in the opposite lane (Todd Ospital) to lose control.  The 
subsequent collision of Mr. Ospital’s car with another car driven by Robert G. Slusher, resulted in 
Mr. Ospital’s death and permanent injuries to Mr. Slusher.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1517 (2003). 
 72. Id. at 1518 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 
(Utah 2001)). 
 73. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1518. 
 74. Id. (quoting State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1142). 
 75. Id. at 1522. 
 76. Id. at 1519. 
 77. Id. 
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to set a high ratio because of the likelihood such misconduct rarely will 
be punished, and the significant civil and criminal penalties which could 
have applied.78  The U.S. Supreme Court granted State Farm’s petition 
for certiorari, characterizing as “neither close nor difficult”79 its 
conclusion that the $145 million punitive damages award was excessive 
under each of its BMW guideposts. 
State Farm’s reprehensibility analysis offered little guidance on the 
relative degrees of reprehensibility that might warrant particularly high 
punitive damages awards, focusing instead on whether a defendant’s 
conduct warranted any punitive liability at all.  The Court emphasized 
that states must presume a plaintiff has been fully compensated, and 
therefore must base punitive damages awards only on conduct “so 
reprehensible” that a sanction beyond compensatory damages is required 
for “punishment or deterrence.”80  This cautionary reminder reflects the 
Court’s rejection of any conception of punitive damages as serving 
compensatory goals.81 
The reprehensibility guidepost of BMW, the Court held, set forth 
strict instructions for courts to consider five factors: whether a 
defendant’s conduct reflects (1) “indifference to or a reckless disregard 
of the health or safety of others,” (2) “intentional malice, trickery, or 
deceit” (as opposed to “mere accident”), or (3) “repeated actions” (as 
opposed to “an isolated incident”); (4) whether the harm inflicted was 
physical or economic; and (5) whether “the target of the conduct had 
financial vulnerability.”82 
Without ranking the relative reprehensibility of these factors, the 
Court noted that the presence of only one might not warrant punitive 
liability.83  The absence of all of these factors makes any award of 
punitive damages “suspect.”84  The Court found the degree of 
 
 78. Id. (citing State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1153-54). 
 79. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 11, at 390 (referencing the “now all-but-discredited 
historical conception of punitive damages as a supplement to individual compensatory damages”); 
Crump, supra note 60, at 182 (“In any event, the compensation rationale for punitive damages is 
dubious.”).  But see Sebok, supra note 6, at 163; Owen, supra note 6, at 373-74 (including 
compensation as one of the functions of punitive damages); Ellis, supra note 10, at 3. 
 82. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.  Some courts, after BMW, had speculated about whether 
the Court had included “intentional malice” as a permissible reprehensibility factor.  See, e.g., 
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(finding helpful the Court’s clarification in State Farm because “we did not originally consider 
intentional malice as a criterion of reprehensibility specifically mentioned in [BMW]”). 
 83. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 84. Id. 
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reprehensibility in State Farm’s conduct sufficient to warrant some 
punitive liability, even though it did not explicitly identify the 
reprehensibility factors on which it based this conclusion.85 
The Court in State Farm also expanded on the federalism concerns 
it addressed in BMW, holding that Utah had impermissibly infringed 
upon the sovereignty of its sister states by punishing State Farm for 
conduct that occurred in other states.  Whether other states would regard 
such conduct as lawful or unlawful, the Court ruled that no state has a 
legitimate interest in punishing conduct that occurs outside its borders.86  
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the basic tenet of 
federalism “that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about 
what conduct is permitted or proscribed within it borders, and each State 
alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a 
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”87  In order to legitimately 
adjudicate State Farm’s conduct toward other people in other states, 
Justice Kennedy explained, those people would have to be included as 
parties and Utah courts would be required to apply the laws of the 
applicable states to their claims.88 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged, however, that the Court’s prior 
cases had established that a plaintiff could introduce out-of-state conduct 
to demonstrate the relative reprehensibility of a defendant’s in-state 
conduct.  First, such conduct may reveal the “deliberateness and 
culpability” of a defendant’s actions.89  Second, prior misconduct by a 
defendant (even in another state) may be relevant because “a recidivist 
may be punished more severely than a first offender.”90 
In State Farm, however, the Court held that neither of these 
justifications applied because the evidence of State Farm’s other alleged 
misconduct failed to bear a sufficient relationship to the specific harm 
inflicted on the Campbells.91  This evidence included State Farm’s 
 
 85. Id.  Clearly the Court found that State Farm acted with at least deceit, if not malice and 
trickery.  And the Campbells were certainly financially vulnerable, although the opinion does not 
mention this factor. 
 86. Id. at 1522 (“Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing 
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s 
jurisdiction.”); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue 
of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 305-09 (1999) (urging post-BMW that 
state sovereignty principles should preclude unlawful as well as lawful out-of-state conduct). 
 87. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523. 
 88. Id. at 1522 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1523. 
 91. Id. (stating that State Farm’s other misconduct “had nothing to do with a third-party 
lawsuit [such as the Campbells’]”). 
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handling of other claims in other states and, even more off the mark, its 
employment practices.92  For a “prior transgression” to be relevant as an 
aggravating factor in the reprehensibility analysis, the Court pointed out, 
the transgression must be “similar” to the conduct being punished.93  
Here, the Court found that the evidence of State Farm’s other 
misconduct had no bearing on its dealings with the Campbells. 
More fundamentally, the Court held that the punitive damages 
award upheld by the Utah Supreme Court violated due process because 
it punished State Farm for conduct “independent from the acts upon 
which liability was premised.”94  Any assessment of reprehensibility 
must be limited to the conduct that caused harm to the plaintiff.  
According to State Farm, due process does not permit a court to 
“adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against the 
defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis.”95  State Farm 
thus walks a very fine line indeed, allowing courts to consider—but not 
punish—out-of-state conduct and harm to people other than the plaintiff 
and, even then, only when such evidence is sufficiently “similar” to the 
specific conduct that harmed the plaintiff.96 
With respect to BMW’s second excessiveness guidepost, the Court 
reiterated its reluctance to set “a bright-line ratio” of punitive damages to 
plaintiff harm which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.97  But 
despite this reluctance, State Farm sets forth a highly detailed ratio 
analysis for lower courts assessing the excessiveness of a punitive 
damages award, including extensive discussion of the factors that will 
justify ratios of 1:1, 4:1, or (in rare cases) awards in excess of 9:1. 
Citing Haslip and BMW, the Court explained that most cases will 
warrant no more than a 4:1 ratio.98  This 4:1 benchmark in part derives 
 
 92. Id.  Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, took issue with the Court’s characterization of this out-
of-state conduct as irrelevant.  She argued that the Campbells’ experience with State Farm indeed 
“exemplifies and reflects an overarching underpayment scheme.”  Id. at 1530 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 93. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (noting that the Utah Supreme Court’s overly broad punitive mission can be summed 
up in its acknowledgment that “[t]he harm is minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate”). 
 96. Cf. Cordray, supra note 86, at 313 (warning of the “significant risk that once the jury is 
presented with evidence of the defendant’s similar misconduct in other states, the jury will succumb 
to the temptation to punish the defendant directly for that conduct as well, rather than simply using 
the evidence to determine reprehensibility”). 
 97. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 
(1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993). 
 98. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (noting that punitive damages awards “more than four 
times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety”); see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 581; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. 
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from a long legislative history of imposing “double, treble or quadruple 
damages to deter and punish.”99  While the Court acknowledged that 
states are not necessarily bound by these ratios, it nevertheless urged 
courts to recognize the “obvious” point that such ratios “are more likely 
to comport with due process” than higher ratios, such as 500:1 (the ratio 
in BMW) or 145:1 (as in State Farm).100 
The Court also asserted that its punitive damages “jurisprudence 
and the principles it has now established” indicate that due process 
rarely will be satisfied by a ratio in excess of 9:1.101  Three factors set 
forth in BMW, according to State Farm, will justify a double digit ratio: 
“where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount 
of economic damages’”; “where ‘the injury is hard to detect’”; or where 
“‘the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
determine.’”102  None of these factors, according to the Court, were 
present in State Farm. 
Indeed, the Court for the first time warned that the converse 
situation, where “compensatory damages are substantial,” may dictate a 
punitive damages award no greater than the plaintiff’s compensatory 
damages, in effect a 1:1 ratio.103  While the Court offered no guidance on 
the amount of compensatory damages it will regard as “substantial,”104 it 
had no trouble finding the Campbells’ $1 million compensatory damages 
award to be “substantial” enough to trigger this 1:1 ratio limitation.105  
Unlike the 4:1 and 9:1 analyses, which the Court asserted its prior cases 
had already demonstrated, State Farm’s 1:1 ratio based on “substantial” 
compensatory damages clearly reflects new territory. 
In yet another new and provocative development, the Court noted 
that the “substantial” compensatory award here already contained a 
“punitive element” because it was based primarily on the emotional 
distress suffered by the Campbells.106  Because such emotional distress 
 
 99. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1524 (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).  In her dissenting 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg harshly criticized the Court’s characterization of its prior punitive 
damages cases as “established” law, pointing out that the first case invalidating a punitive damages 
award on due process grounds occurred as recently as 1996: “If our activity in this domain is now 
‘well-established,’ it takes place on ground not long held.”  Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 1524 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. 
 105. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (concluding that a punitive damages award “at or near” $1 
million would be warranted). 
 106. Id. at 1525. 
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damages already seek to “condemn” a defendant for the “outrage and 
humiliation” suffered by plaintiffs, the Court suggested that punitive 
damages might be unnecessarily “duplicat[ive].”107  This analysis is 
consistent with the argument for de novo review made in Cooper that at 
an earlier time punitive damage awards operated to provide 
compensation for elements of damages for which recovery was not 
permitted under traditional rules restricting actual damages.108  It 
remains to be seen how serious the Court is about this particular 
limitation on punitive damages, but its potential implications for tort 
cases involving emotional distress could be quite significant. 
State Farm also rejected each of the Utah Supreme Court’s 
proffered justifications for its triple digit ratio.  First, State Farm’s 
misconduct in other states could only properly be considered in the 
reprehensibility analysis—and the Court reiterated its conclusion that the 
out-of-state conduct here had no relevance because of its insufficient 
nexus to the plaintiffs’ harm.109  With respect to the Utah Supreme 
Court’s second justification, the Court found insufficient evidence in the 
record to support the assertion that a high ratio was warranted because 
State Farm’s conduct affected other Utah citizens.  Third, the Court 
emphasized that because a state must justify its punitive damages awards 
only with regard to the conduct that specifically harmed the plaintiff, a 
high punitive damages award could not be justified on the basis that a 
defendant will otherwise “be punished in only the rare case.”110 
Finally, the Court disapproved of Utah’s reliance on the relative 
wealth of State Farm in justifying its high ratio: “The wealth of a 
defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages 
award.”111  This statement appears to be somewhat at odds with the 
Court’s approval in TXO of a state punitive damages procedure that 
expressly included the wealth of the defendant as a permissible factor for 
the jury to consider.112  As in its treatment of out-of-state conduct and 
 
 107. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1977)). 
 108. See Sebok, supra note 6. 
 109. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525. 
 110. Id.  But see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its 
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2211-15 (1999) (urging that “the rate at which the probability 
of punishment declines is a key factor” in determining the proper amount of punitive damages). 
 111. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525. 
 112. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) (“Under well-
settled law, however, factors such as these [including net worth of the defendant] are typically 
considered in assessing punitive damages.”); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 
1, 21-22 (1991) (permitting an appellate court to consider the defendant’s “financial position”).  Yet 
the Court in TXO acknowledged that the enormous wealth of the defendant “increased the risk that 
the award may have been influenced by prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special 
17
Hines: Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
HINES2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:31 AM 
796 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:779 
harm to others, the Court here declined to declare such evidence 
inadmissible, but nevertheless imposed strict limitations on its relevance 
that will likely prove difficult for juries and courts to apply. 
With respect to the third prong of the BMW excessiveness test, the 
Court pointedly observed that it “need not dwell long on this guidepost” 
because the relevant Utah statute would only have sanctioned State Farm 
with a $10,000 fine, “an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive 
damages award.”113  The Court’s brief treatment of this third guidepost, 
however, included a warning to courts regarding comparisons to 
criminal sanctions, which its prior jurisprudence had explicitly 
authorized.  The Court acknowledged that its opinions in both BMW and 
Haslip had permitted courts to consider relevant criminal penalties to 
demonstrate “the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful 
actions.”114  But the Court cautioned that criminal sanctions have little 
utility in determining the propriety of a particular amount of punitive 
damages: “Punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal 
process, and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not 
automatically sustain a punitive damages award.”115 
Justice Ginsburg dissented in State Farm, as she did in BMW, on 
the basis that the Court’s invalidation of the Utah Supreme Court’s 
award represents an impermissible intrusion into the states’ domain.116  
Justice Ginsburg specifically took issue with the  Court’s ratio 
instructions, which she regarded as imposing “numerical controls” that 
violate fundamental principles of federalism.117  Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg characterized the Court’s decision in State Farm as 
representing a dangerously “swift conversion” of the flexible BMW 
guideposts to “instructions that begin to resemble marching orders.”118 
 
concern when the defendant is a nonresident.”  Id. at 464.  And Justice O’Connor partly based her 
dissenting opinion in TXO on her concerns about the possible prejudice this factor played in the 
jury’s high award.  Id. at 493 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 113. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.  The Court also rejected Utah’s reliance on “the loss of 
State Farm’s business license, the disgorgement of profits, and possible imprisonment” because 
such sanctions were impermissibly based on irrelevant out-of-state conduct.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 1526 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 575; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23). 
 115. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process 
to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal 
trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof.”). 
 116. Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 117. Id. at 1531. 
 118. Id.  Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented from the Court’s opinion in State Farm, in 
brief opinions reiterating their view that “excessive” punitive damages awards are not precluded by 
the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 1526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Scalia also reiterated his belief that the BMW guidepost analysis “is insusceptible of principled 
application.”  Id. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/4
HINES2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:31 AM 
2004] DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 797 
III.  POST-STATE FARM: CONTINUING AMBIGUITIES AND UNRESOLVED 
QUESTIONS 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in State Farm suggests a puzzlement 
bordering on incredulity that the Utah Supreme Court could have been 
so misguided in its application of the BMW guideposts,119 a tone also 
present in Justice Stevens’ discussion of the BMW guideposts in 
Cooper.120  One suspects that the present majority of the Court in 
support of a substantive due process right to challenge the imposition of 
punitive damages awards has been disappointed by the failure of some 
lower courts to comprehend or adhere to its guidance, prompting a 
decision in State Farm that stakes out bolder and more detailed 
boundaries on permissible levels of punitive damages. 
Yet it is clear from the questions left unanswered (and, in some 
cases, created) by State Farm that the Court inevitably will be forced to 
return to its task of elucidating those boundaries.  This Part will briefly 
examine some of those open issues and the immediate aftermath of State 
Farm on lower courts. 
A.  Interpreting State Farm’s Reprehensibility Instructions 
The Court in BMW and State Farm considered reprehensibility a 
vital factor in the due process excessiveness analysis, both in justifying 
any punitive damages at all and in calculating the acceptable size of an 
award, if one is imposed.121  BMW suggested that reprehensibility, which 
the Court defined as referring to the “enormity” of the defendant’s 
offense, may be the most important of the three guideposts.122  The 
Court expanded on this theme in State Farm by enumerating five 
specific factors that courts may utilize in evaluating the degree of 
culpability a defendant’s conduct may demonstrate.123  While the 
Court’s list may not exhaust the possibilities of flagrant conduct 
warranting punitive damages,124 it is certainly unlikely that the absence 
 
 119. See id. at 1521 (referring to the proper application of BMW’s guideposts on the facts of 
State Farm as representing “neither [a] close nor difficult” case). 
 120. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 441 (2001) 
(referring to a “series of questionable conclusions” in the district court’s application of BMW that 
the Ninth Circuit would do well to reconsider during its de novo review on remand). 
 121. But see Crump, supra note 60, at 233 (arguing that an approach “concentrating principally 
on blameworthiness confounds the accuracy of the process because of the greater difficulty of fixing 
and evaluating this philosophical abstraction”). 
 122. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 123. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003). 
 124. See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) 
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of all of the enumerated factors would yield a defensible decision to 
award punitive damages.  Beyond its suggestion, however, that a 
defendant’s conduct may not be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant any 
punitive liability if only one of these factors is present,125 State Farm 
offers little guidance as to the relative weight of these reprehensibility 
factors or how they may interact with each other to enhance the 
reasonableness of a particular punitive damages award. 
Moreover, the Court’s handling of the reprehensibility analysis in 
both BMW and State Farm suggests the possibility that the Court did not 
think the facts of either case warranted any award of punitive damages at 
all, but was unwilling to so rule, preferring to focus primary attention on 
the unjustifiable sizes of the awards.  The Court’s reprehensibility 
discussion appears more suited to a threshold determination of whether  
to impose punitive damages rather than providing any insight into how 
the relative degree of reprehensibility can inform the size of a particular 
award.  Again, while the facts of State Farm struck the Court as 
reflecting conduct more reprehensible than that in BMW, neither case 
involved the kind of reprehensible conduct that might justify a high 
award even exceeding its proposed ratio scale. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that lower courts have continued to 
flounder somewhat in their attempts to apply the Court’s imprecise 
instructions about the role reprehensibility plays in justifying and 
determining the proper size of punitive damage awards.126  An open 
question of particular importance is the role of a reprehensibility factor 
so far absent from the Court’s cases: the defendant’s intentional 
disregard for the health and safety of others.  Of the courts considering 
State Farm’s impact in such cases, some have taken the position that this 
factor justifies an award higher than 4:1, particularly if coupled with 
other factors, such as intentional malice, trickery or deceit.127 This 
 
(explaining that the “fraudulent business practices” in BMW and State Farm are significantly 
“different in kind from the reprehensibility of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or 
ethnicity”). 
 125. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Inv. Serv., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that “according to the hierarchy of reprehensiveness, [defendant’s breach of fiduciary 
duty] was clearly more reprehensibile than the conduct in [BMW], and is at a similar level to the 
conduct in State Farm”); DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding a punitive 
damages award excessive despite presence of each of BMW’s “aggravating factors”); Eden Elec., 
Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (reading State Farm to preclude a 
punitive damages award more than ten times compensatory damages “even where all the 
reprehensibile considerations are present”). 
 127. See Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 675 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).  The Oregon Court 
of Appeals, however, declined to apply a ratio in excess of 4:1 in a case involving serious personal 
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confusion among lower courts is bound to persist until the Court 
articulates more clearly the relative significance of the reprehensibility 
factor in determining the amount of a punitive damages award, most 
likely in a case reflecting such highly reprehensible conduct that there is 
no question about punitive liability.  Ultimately, the Court may have to 
articulate claim-specific categories of reprehensibility to help lower 
courts assess the relative reprehensibility in cases involving employment 
discrimination, product liability, environmental harms, or fraud cases.  
Further refinement of the reprehensibility factor may prove particularly 
critical if State Farm’s ratio instructions result in punitive damage 
awards that under-deter defendant misconduct by adhering too strictly to 
the Court’s 4:1 benchmark or applying its 1:1 ratio too aggressively. 
B.  Implementing State Farm’s Ratio Guidelines 
One of the loudest messages to emerge from State Farm is the 
Court’s instruction regarding the constitutionally required relationship 
between the amount of a punitive damages award and the degree of harm 
caused by the defendant’s conduct.128  While the Court in State Farm 
purported only to be clarifying limitations its prior cases had already 
established, its proportionality analysis for the first time established a 
4:1 benchmark ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, as 
well as factors that will justify upward or downward departures from 
that ratio.  State and federal courts alike have responded to State Farm’s 
ratio instructions, striking down129 a host of punitive damages awards on 
 
injury from a defective fishbowl because of the absence of other aggravating factors and “the 
Supreme Court’s focus on ratios in the usual case.”  Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 
576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (remitting a punitive damages award from $1 million to $403,000 post-
State Farm, reducing the ratio from 10:1 to 4:1). 
 128. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.  Applying State Farm’s ratio analysis, 
one district court explained that “whatever vagueness and tensions State Farm seems to reflect, to 
this [c]ourt the ruling’s higher frequencies are quite audible.”  TVT Records v. Island Def Jam 
Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (remitting multi-million punitive damages 
awards it found constitutionally excessive in light of high punitive to compensatory damages ratio). 
 129. Courts have grappled with the proper disposition of an excessive punitive damages award, 
variously granting a remittitur (permitting the plaintiff to accept the court’s assessment of an 
acceptable punitive damages award or face a new trial), reducing such awards to the “constitutional 
maximum” or, in the case of appellate courts, remanding the award to the trial court for a new trial.  
Compare Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (ordering remittitur of 
excessive punitive damages award) and BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994) 
(same), with Johansen v. Combustion Eng., Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The court 
orders a remittitur when it believes the jury’s award is unreasonable on the facts.  A constitutional 
reduction, on the other hand, is a determination that the law does not permit the award [and the 
court therefore] has a mandatory duty to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict . . . .”) and 
Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003) (remanding for new trial). 
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the basis that the ratios at issue reflected an unconstitutionally 
disproportionate amount of punitive damages.130 
But to the extent Justice Ginsburg predicted that State Farm’s ratio 
analysis would amount to “marching orders” to state courts,131 those 
orders certainly have not been uniformly received by lower courts.  State 
Farm’s warnings about excessive punitive damages ratios may well have 
been loud, but they are far from clear.132  This lack of clarity, to some 
degree, is simply a function of the Court’s appropriate refusal to 
announce a per se ratio that would calculate the constitutionally precise 
amount of punitive damages in every case.133  No such bright-line test 
could possibly be imposed, of course, because each case requires 
individualized assessment of both the wrongful conduct and the harm it 
caused.134  As Judge Posner has explained: “The judicial function is to 
police a range, not a point.”135  But courts continue to struggle even with 
the assessment of a proper constitutional range of punitive damages in 
the wake of State Farm. 
1.  Identifying the State Farm “Benchmark” 
State Farm’s ratio instructions appear to reflect a set of punitive 
damages guidelines reminiscent of sentencing guidelines in criminal 
cases.  The Court reiterated its approval of a 4:1 ratio between punitive 
 
 130. See, e.g., TVT Records, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 413; Waits v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 4010, 
2003 WL 21310277 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1225, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974-75 (N.D. 
Iowa 2003); Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 671; Bocci, 76 P.3d 669; Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing State 
Farm as “signal[ing] unequivocally that the Due Process Clause serves to constrain jury and court 
discretion,” but providing far “less clear” guidance to courts regarding “the assessment of how 
much is too much”). 
 133. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003) (quoting BMW, 
517 U.S. at 582) (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked 
by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the 
punitive award.”); see also Williams v. Kaufman County, 343 F.3d 689, 711 n.77 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(noting the “necessarily unscientific balancing of the factors laid out in [BMW]” as a significant 
factor in finding the amount of punitive damages awarded to be reasonable). 
 134. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“The precise award in any case, of course, must be based 
upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.”); cf. 
Crump, supra note 60, at 212 (suggesting that ratio analysis can be defended on the ground that 
“actual damages provide a measure – albeit an exceedingly rough measure – of the actor’s moral 
blameworthiness”). 
 135. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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and compensatory damages,136 and then acknowledged specific factors 
that would warrant upward or lower departures from that benchmark.137  
The Court suggested that ratios exceeding 9:1 will rarely comport with 
due process,138 while a ratio as low as 1:1 may “perhaps” be the 
“outermost limit” in cases involving “substantial” compensatory 
damages.139  Although State Farm’s sliding scale ratio analysis will 
likely constrain some of the most disproportionate punitive damages 
awards, they also introduce several new interpretive challenges for lower 
courts to address. 
The Court’s cautionary language about ratios exceeding 9:1 seems 
to have resonated most pervasively among lower courts.140  Several 
courts have recognized that double-digit ratios raise a “red flag,”141 
while others have called such awards “suspect” under State Farm.142  
Indeed, the vast majority of decisions reversing awards of punitive 
damages have involved double or triple digit ratios of punitive to 
compensatory damages.143 
Some courts seem to have interpreted State Farm’s statements 
 
 136. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (referencing double, treble and quadruple ratios, and 
its prior endorsements of a 4:1 ratio); see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 581; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. 
 137. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
 138. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.  The Court identified three justifications for “ratios greater 
than those we have previously upheld.”  Id.  This reference to the Court’s prior ratios is not 
particularly illuminating, however, because it held that a 4:1 ratio in Haslip was “close to the line of 
constitutional impropriety,” 499 U.S. at 23-24, while in TXO it approved a ratio of over 500:1 (or 
10:1 pursuant to the Court’s “potential harm” analysis). 
 139. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. 
 140. See, e.g., Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 
(“accept[ing]” that post-BMW and State Farm, a punitive damages award “probably cannot exceed a 
10:1 ratio”); Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“As we read 
[State Farm], a double-digit ratio will be justified rarely, and perhaps never in a case where the 
plaintiff has recovered an ample award of compensatory damages.”). 
 141. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2003); see also 
Jones v. Sheahan, No. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) 
(double-digit ratios “raise[] a cautionary flag”). 
 142. Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., Inc., No. WD 61179, 2003 WL 21487311 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003). 
 143. See, e.g., Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) 
(remitting 10:1 ratio to 4:1); Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682 (D.C. 2003) (remitting 26:1 ratio 
to 5:1); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remitting 58:1 ratio to 
5:1); Waits, 2003 WL 21310277 (remitting 100:1 and 33:1 ratios to an average ratio of 1.5:1); 
McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (reducing 20:1 ratio to 9:1 ratio); Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 671 
(reversing punitive damages award reflecting a 20:1 ratio); Henley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42 (remitting 
17:1 ratio to 6:1); Diamond Woodworks, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761-62 (remitting 13:1 ratio to 3.8:1); 
Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (remitting 45:1 ratio to 7:1).  But see, 
e.g., TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (remitting 
as excessive punitive damages awards reflecting a 6:1 ratio to achieve a 1:1 ratio); Eden Elec, 258 
F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (reducing 8:1 ratio to 4:1). 
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evincing particular concern about ratios higher than single digits as 
tantamount to the Court’s approval of any award 9:1 or less.144  The 
Ninth Circuit, for example, in Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc., 
defended the constitutionality of a 7:1 ratio by declaring that “[w]e are 
aware of no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case disapproving of a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and we 
decline to extend the law in this case.”145  State Farm clearly does not 
support such an interpretation, as evidenced by its detailed articulation 
of the factors warranting ratios higher than double digits and those that 
suggest a 1:1 ratio ceiling.146  Due process cannot be satisfied by resort 
to such a sledgehammer approach, amounting to the virtual immunity 
from constitutional scrutiny of any award under a 10:1 ratio.  While 
confusing and imprecise, State Farm’s proportionality instructions 
require a far more nuanced and fact-specific inquiry into the 
constitutionality of any award. 
2.   Factors Justifying Upward Departures from the State Farm 
Benchmark 
While only a few courts have actually imposed punitive damages 
reflecting a 4:1 ratio post-State Farm,147 most have acknowledged the 
need to identify circumstances that justify an upward departure from the 
4:1 ratio.148  One lower court summed up State Farm as holding that “in 
the usual case, i.e., a case in which the compensatory damages are 
neither exceptionally high nor low, and in which the defendant’s conduct 
is neither exceptionally extreme nor trivial, the outer constitutional limit 
on the amount of punitive damages is approximately four times the 
 
 144. McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (finding that 6:1 ratio “easily meets [State Farm’s] new 
ratio test,” and may “presumptively pass[] muster under the Due Process Clause”); Haggar Clothing 
Co. v. Hernandez, No. 13-01-009-CV, 2003 WL 21982181 (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2003) (approving 
6.6:1 ratio in retaliatory discharge case as “within constitutional limits” apparently because the ratio 
did not exceed double-digits); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 
789, 803 (Wis. 2003) (approving punitive damages ratio of 7:1 without any explanation of why the 
case warranted a ratio higher than 4:1); cf. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1075 (Utah 
2003) (referring to a 5:1 ratio as “well within the single digits discussed by the Supreme Court in 
State Farm”). 
 145. Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 146. See, e.g., Bocci, 76 P.3d 669 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that under State Farm any 
award that has only a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process). 
 147. Jones v. Sheahan, Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 
2003) (finding case warranted punitive damages ratio neither higher nor lower than 4:1); Parrish v. 
Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (referencing and enforcing the 4:1 “baseline” 
established by State Farm); Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75; Diamond, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. 
 148. See, e.g., Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/4
HINES2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:31 AM 
2004] DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 803 
amount of compensatory damages.”149  Determining which cases are 
“usual” and which involve “exceptional” circumstances, of course, has 
not been an easy task. 
Courts have cited each of the factors identified in State Farm150 in 
justifying upward departures, authorizing ratios in excess of 4:1 (in some 
cases as high as 100:1),151 where “the injury is hard to detect,”152 or 
where “the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been 
difficult to determine,”153 or where a “particularly egregious act has 
resulted in only a small amount of economic154 damages.”155 
With respect to the last factor, courts interpreting the requirement 
of a sufficiently “egregious act” have concluded that upward departures 
were warranted by conduct that reflected a disregard for the health156 or 
 
 149. Diamond, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762; see also Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, 78 P.3d 570, 
576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (referring to the Court’s 4:1 ratio for the “usual” case). 
 150. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). 
 151. Id. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving 100:1 ratio in case 
involving housing discrimination where compensatory damages were only $500). 
 152. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.  See, e.g., Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., Nos. 
WD 61179, WD 61210, WD 61245, 2003 WL 21487311, at *10 (Mo. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003) 
(justifying 13:1 ratio with reference to fact that “[t]he laws of chance would crack under the weight 
of a claim that the average consumer could have detected the kind of fraud perpetrated in this 
case”); see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2082 (justifying punitive damages where defendant 
“has been able to conceal his identity”). 
 153. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003); Jones 
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Kan. 2003); S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 
281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (D. Ariz. 2003) (explaining that defendant’s “unquantifiable breach of 
the public trust” warranted $60 million punitive damages award); Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 
103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2003). 
 154. The Court’s imprecise reference to “economic” rather than “compensatory” damages, 
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521-25, has not been interpreted as a limiting factor, as courts have 
invoked this upward departure rationale in a number of cases involving damages based on physical 
or personal (as opposed to “purely economic”) harm.  See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672; Phelps, 
103 S.W.3d at 46; Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Henley v. Philip 
Morris Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); cf. Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 
1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that intentional discrimination on the basis of race or 
ethnicity reflects a very “different kind of harm, a serious affront to personal liberty”). 
 155. See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672; Williams v. Kaufman County, 343 F.3d 689, 711 n.75 
(5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 150:1 ratio in civil rights case, finding State Farm’s ratio guidance to be 
“inapposite” in a case involving $100 in nominal damages); Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 
2003); Jones, 2003 WL 22132723; Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46; Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Henley v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 
2083. 
 156. See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672 (approving a 37:1 ratio because defendant exposed 
plaintiffs to a known bedbug infestation); Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46 (approving 11:1 ratio in case 
where teenagers were killed by defendant’s negligence); Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669 (reducing punitive 
damages award ratio from 45:1 to 7:1 ratio due to defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations 
regarding the safety of a prescription drug); Henley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 42 (reducing a punitive 
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dignitary interests157 of others, or misconduct by a state official.158  Most 
courts have interpreted “small,” however, to be a relative rather than an 
absolute term.  Compensatory damages ranging from $150,000 to 
$500,000 have been deemed sufficiently “small” to warrant the 
imposition of a ratio in excess of 4:1 (although less than 9:1).159  Indeed, 
the district court in the Exxon Valdez case recently characterized 
compensatory damages of over $500,000,000 as small enough to warrant 
a high ratio, remitting its previously reversed punitive damages award of 
$5 billion to $4.5 billion.160 Given this range of compensatory damages 
awards that few would consider “small” as an objective matter, further 
guidance, obviously short of an absolute number, is needed to help lower 
courts more uniformly and fairly determine when a higher ratio should 
be imposed based on this rationale. 
“Potential” harm represents another factor acknowledged by the 
Court as justifying an otherwise high ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages.161  In State Farm, the Court reiterated its prior holdings that a 
punitive damages award (the denominator162 in the ratio equation) 
should be compared to a nominator reflecting not only the harm 
reflected in a plaintiff’s actual damages, but also the amount of 
“potential” harm that might have been caused by a defendant’s 
conduct.163  Determining both the likelihood164 and the amount of such 
 
damages award that reflected a 17:1 ratio to 6:1, justifying its upward departure from 4:1 because of 
defendant’s “extraordinarily reprehensible” conduct in tortiously manufacturing and marketing 
cigarettes). 
 157. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003) (housing discrimination); Jones, 
281 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 (sexual harassment claim). 
 158. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003) 
(illegal interference and cover-up by state corporation commissioner).  But see Jones v. Sheahan, 
Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16  (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that sheriff’s failure to adequately protect inmates from harm was sufficiently 
reprehensible to warrant the double-digit punitive damages ratios of 20:1 and 10:1). 
 159. See, e.g., Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46 ($150,000 in compensatory damages justified 11:1 
ratio resulting in a $2 million punitive damages award); Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669 ($500,000 in 
compensatory damages justified 6:1 ratio because of outrageousness of defendant’s conduct).  But 
see Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672 ($5,000 in compensatory damages). 
 160. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004).  The court explained that 
while the aggregate compensatory damages were high, the per plaintiff compensatory damages 
amounted only to $15,000. 
 161. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524-25; see also supra  note 31 and accompanying text. 
 162. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1243 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 163. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524-25; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
582 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (first 
acknowledging the concept of relevant “potential” harm). 
 164. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 442 (2001) 
(distinguishing between harm “likely” to occur and harm that might occur); Roth v. Farner-Bocken 
Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 669 (S.D. 2003) (finding “unlikelihood of serious potential harm”). 
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potential harm, however, are both “ordinarily arguable” and “somewhat 
indeterminate” endeavors,165 which the Court failed squarely to address 
in either State Farm or BMW.166  Its discussion of this factor in Cooper, 
however, puts lower courts on notice that a remote likelihood of such 
potential harm will not suffice to justify a high ratio.167 
Despite this lack of guidance, lower courts have read the Court’s 
State Farm opinion as adhering to its previous dictates regarding the 
relevance of potential harm, and have permitted punitive damages 
awards in amounts they would have deemed excessive absent this 
factor.168  In order to take potential harm into account in justifying a 
larger than ordinary award, at the very least, courts should require a 
showing that the fact-finder relied on such theoretical impact in setting 
the award; a potential harm analysis should not be introduced post hoc to 
justify an otherwise excessive award.169 
3.   Factors Justifying Downward Departures from the State Farm 
Benchmark 
While lower courts have readily applied State Farm’s grounds for 
permitting upward departures from the 4:1 ratio benchmark, only a few 
have even recognized State Farm’s guidance regarding downward 
departures.170  The Court in State Farm suggested that the amount of 
punitive damages might be limited to reflect a ratio “perhaps only equal 
 
 165. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1243. 
 166. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (D. Ariz. 
2003) (noting that while “[t]he use of potential harm in assessing the ratio continues throughout the 
Court’s most recent decisions,” neither BMW nor State Farm “involved an issue of potential harm”). 
 167. Cooper, 532 U.S. 424 . 
 168. See, e.g., Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Inv. Serv., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding $1.25 million punitive damages award as constitutionally reasonable because plaintiffs 
would have suffered multi-million dollars in damages “if [the defendant’s] scheme had worked”); S. 
Union Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (even though plaintiff did not recover compensatory damages 
for “speculative lost profits, the potential for such damage could be factored into the jury’s decision 
to punish [the defendant]”); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 
789, 803 (Wis. 2003) (determining that the ratio of punitive damages to harm reflected an 
acceptable 7:1 ratio when potential harm to plaintiff was considered); Simon v. San Paolo U.S. 
Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 169. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 483-87 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 170. See, e.g., TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Roth v. Farner-
Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003).  A California appeals court invoked State Farm’s 
“substantial” compensatory damages language, but interpreted it as instructing that “where a 
plaintiff has been fully compensated with a substantial compensatory damages award, any ratio over 
4 to 1 is ‘close to the line.’”  Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 42, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003). 
27
Hines: Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
HINES2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:31 AM 
806 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:779 
to compensatory damages” when a plaintiff has been awarded 
“substantial” compensatory damages.171  Indeed, in State Farm itself, the 
Court urged the Utah court on remand to consider a 1:1 ratio appropriate 
in light of the Campbells’ “substantial” $1 million in compensatory 
damages.172 
State Farm’s downward departure reasoning reflects the Court’s 
imposition of a new due process limitation on the imposition of punitive 
damages awards,173 and its significance has yet to be fully explored.  
Again, as in determining the concept of “small” damages warranting 
upward departures, the Court in State Farm provided scant guidance 
regarding the relative or absolute amount of damages courts should 
regard as “substantial” enough to justify only a 1:1 ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages.  Some lower courts that have 
expressly addressed this factor have found that compensatory damages 
of $25,000174 and $125,000175 were “substantial” enough to warrant a 
downward departure to a 1:1 ratio.176  But most courts have failed 
entirely to acknowledge this possible limitation on punitive damages 
awards, awarding compensatory damages ranging from $360,000177 to 
$15 million178 without any consideration of whether such compensatory 
awards were sufficiently “substantial” to justify a smaller amount of 
 
 171. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524; cf. Crump, supra note 60, at 224 (pointing out that a rigid 
ratio analysis will overcompensate “where the conduct is discoverable and results in high actual 
damage awards”). 
 172. State Farm, 123 S. Ct.  at 1526. 
 173. The Ninth Circuit recognized this basis for limiting a punitive damages award in a case 
decided pre-State Farm.  In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001).  In Exxon 
Valdez, the Ninth Circuit remanded a $5 billion punitive damages award as unconstitutionally 
excessive, in part, because defendant’s $3.4 billion “costs and settlements in this case are so large, a 
lesser amount is necessary to deter future acts.”  Id.  Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit included 
consideration of Exxon’s total “expenses,” which included, in addition to the compensatory 
damages at issue, Exxon’s clean up costs, other settlements, the fine and restitution imposed, and its 
casualty losses.  Id. 
 174. Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003).  But see Jones v. Sheahan, 
Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) (declaring that the 
compensatory damages award of $25,000 was not “substantial” enough to warrant only a 1:1 ratio). 
 175. See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 176. See also Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, No. 00-CV-1270, 01-CV-227, 2003 WL 23018830 (D.C. 
Dec. 24, 2003) ($187,000); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
($2 million). 
 177. See Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (approving 
7:1 ratio). 
 178. See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (explaining that its “$50 million punitive award is barely above three times the compensatory 
award of $15 million in this case, . . . not even reaching the 4:1 ratio mentioned by the Court as a 
threshold where the punitive award may become suspect”). 
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punitive damages.179  At the very least, State Farm demands that courts 
consider the possibility of a downward departure when a case involves  
“substantial” compensatory damages, and the inconsistency of lower 
courts’ interpretations of what constitutes “substantial” suggests the need 
for additional guidance from the Court. 
C.  Role of Defendant’s Relative Wealth 
In conventional tort theory, besides serving a retributive purpose, 
the imposition of a punitive damages award may also serve the public 
policy function of deterring the specific defendant from repeating the 
actionable wrong, and providing a disincentive to others to commit 
similar wrongs.  This deterrent objective ordinarily allows a court to take 
into account the relative wealth of the defendant in fashioning a punitive 
damages award to assure the desired preventive effect.180 
Over Justice O’Connor’s impassioned dissent,181 the Supreme 
Court approved in TXO a state court’s imposition of an enormous 
punitive damages award where the defendant’s wealth was one of the 
primary factors considered by the jury.182  In striking down Utah’s 
imposition of punitive damages in State Farm, however, the Court 
expressly rejected Utah’s attempt to justify the size of its award on the 
basis of the substantial wealth of the defendant, saying such a rationale 
 
 179. See, e.g., DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (remitting to $75,000 a 
punitive damages award of $1.275 million in a police brutality case without consideration of 
whether plaintiff’s $250,000 compensatory damages award was sufficiently “substantial” to 
otherwise justify downward departure); S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090 
(D. Ariz. 2003) (approving a 153:1 ratio despite compensatory damages of $390,000); Eden Elec., 
Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974-75 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (reducing punitive damages 
award from 8:1 to 4:1 ratio in case involving $2 million in compensatory damages); Advocat, Inc. v. 
Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346 (Ark. 2003) (approving $63 million punitive damages award where plaintiff 
was awarded $5 million in compensatory damages, explaining that the resulting 14:1 ratio – 
incorrectly described by the court as 4:1 – is not “breathtaking”); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ($5,000,000 compensatory damages award). 
 180. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003) (ruling that a 
defendant’s wealth can be “either an aggravating or a mitigating factor in determining the size of a 
punitive damage award, since punitive damages should be tailored to what is necessary to deter the 
particular defendant, as well as others similarly situated, from repeating the prohibited conduct”).  
But see Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (“On a conventional view about optimal deterrence, 
however, wealth and income are irrelevant”: “[A] punitive damages award should encourage a 
defendant to engage in optimal behavior, whatever its wealth.”). 
 181. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 472-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 27-31 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. See id. at 461; see also Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (noting that in pre-BMW cases, the 
Court permitted juries to “consider the defendant’s wealth in determining punitive damages,” 
although “the wealth of the wrongdoer must not be unduly emphasized”). 
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could not validate an “otherwise unconstitutional” award.183 
This apparent inconsistency with the TXO decision may be 
confusing to lower courts, but it highlights the Court’s seemingly narrow 
focus on the punishment feature of punitive damages,184 almost to the 
exclusion of the well-settled deterrence function of such awards.185  
Logically, if two defendants commit the same reprehensible act, causing 
the same actual harm, and subject to the same criminal or civil fine, a 
higher punitive damages award would be justified to deter repeated 
wrongdoing by the wealthier of the two defendants.186  An amount that 
might be sufficient to deter a less wealthy defendant could very well be 
written off as simply a cost of doing business by a much wealthier 
corporation, undermining the achievement of the deterrence goals of 
punitive damages.  And it is certainly true that for the less wealthy of the 
two, a punitive damages award calculated irrespective of wealth risks 
overdeterrence or potentially bankrupting the defendant by an award that 
might only sting the wealthier but devastates the less wealthy defendant.  
It is uncertain whether or when the Court will provide more explicit 
guidance on the propriety of taking the defendant’s wealth into account 
for the purpose of achieving effective deterrence,187 but State Farm is 
clearly not being read by lower courts as foreclosing consideration of 
wealth as a factor in deciding on the appropriate size of a punitive 
damages award believed to be otherwise within constitutional 
parameters.188 
 
 183. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). 
 184. The Ninth Circuit, considering the case remanded to it by the Supreme Court in Cooper, 
noted that the “potential deterrent effect of a punitive damages award is not mentioned expressly in 
the [BMW] criteria, although it has continued to be considered in post-[BMW] cases.  Here, we 
acknowledge that the evidence would support a finding that a substantial punitive award might be 
necessary to have a sufficient economic effect on Cooper to create deterrence.” Leatherman Tool 
Group v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d 
at 975 (concluding that due process required it to “throw into the balance and otherwise take into 
account [the defendant’s] net worth” when evaluating the amount of a punitive damages award). 
 185. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2082 (discussing “traditional view” of punitive 
damages as serving deterrence goals). 
 186. See, e.g., Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (explaining that “an award that would effectively 
punish and deter General Motors or Bill Gates would have to be many, many times greater than an 
award which would adequately punish and deter, say, the local one-store druggist”).  But see 
Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (“On a conventional view about optimal deterrence, however, 
wealth and income are irrelevant.”  “[A] punitive damages award should encourage a defendant to 
engage in optimal behavior, whatever its wealth.”). 
 187. Cf. Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (pointing out the “particularly important dispute” 
regarding “whether, on economic grounds, the wealth or income of the defendant should matter”). 
 188. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(reasoning that State Farm did not preclude consideration of the wealth of a defendant to the extent 
that factor “enables the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense against suits such as 
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D.  The Aggregate Punishment Problem 
One of the most significant questions left open after BMW and State 
Farm is the proper calculation of, and the constitutional limitations on, 
punitive damages for harm that affects multiple people.  Courts and 
commentators for decades have agonized over the policy aspects of the 
aggregate punishment problem: how to achieve deterrence and 
punishment goals in a case involving defendant conduct that affected 
large numbers of people.189  If one punishes too lightly, a defendant 
alleged to have caused harm to many may well be undeterred from 
continuing the misconduct.  Yet if courts impose significant punitive 
damages awards in every case brought by a plaintiff affected by the 
misconduct, the aggregate punitive damages liability may far exceed 
legitimate state interests in punishment and deterrence.190 
Although BMW itself involved a fraud perpetrated against 14 
people in Alabama, the Court was frustratingly opaque about how to 
determine punitive damages in such cases.  In a footnote, for example 
the Court observed that whether one looked to the ratio of the punitive 
damages award to Dr. Gore’s harm ($4,000) or to all the harms imposed 
on the Alabama citizens affected by BMW’s misconduct ($56,000), the 
punitive damages award must be seen as disproportionate.191  So the 
Court evaded the question of which measure courts ought to use in 
calculating punitive damages in such mass tort cases – should a court 
assess the punitive damages award vis-à-vis the harm done to the 
plaintiff alone or should it compare the award to the full scope of harm 
inflicted on everyone affected by the misconduct?  Given the 
 
this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for 
the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case”); Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974 
(concluding that “if the punitive damages award is to have any punitive or deterrent effect – the 
stated rationale of such damages – then it is apparent that [the defendant’s] wealth and financial 
condition must be taken into consideration”); cf. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 
2003) 
 189. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: 
Strong Medicine or Poison Pill?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 415, 423-31 (1994); Dennis Neil Jones et al., 
Multiple Punitive Damages Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a 
National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A 
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 152 (1986); Richard 
A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, 
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 55 (1983); David G. Owen, Problems in 
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1982); Laura J. Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 889, 892-98 (2001). 
 190. See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 189, at 55. 
 191. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 n.35. 
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constitutional implications of excessive punishment, this question looms 
large in mass tort cases.  And not only must a court choose whether to 
take into account harm done to persons other than the plaintiff, it must 
also consider the implications of prior punitive damages awards based 
on the same misconduct.  If deterrence and punishment goals have been 
met by prior awards, must a court deny any punitive damages in 
subsequent cases? 
State Farm offers some tantalizing hints about the Court’s views on 
the question of aggregate punitive damages, but offers no clear guidance.  
While the Court ultimately rejects (over Justice Ginsburg’s objections) 
Utah’s characterization of State Farm’s conduct in its handling of other 
claims as sufficiently “similar” to play any role at all in the proper 
calculation of punitive damages in the Campbells’ case,192 it noted that 
truly similar conduct would be “relevant” to the state’s determination of 
reprehensibility.193  Yet the Court in State Farm articulated an arguably 
individualistic approach to punitive damages, emphasizing that “a 
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the 
plaintiff,”194 and criticizing the Utah courts for punishing State Farm for 
harm that was “minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate.”195  
The Court explained that “[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the 
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ 
hypothetical claims against a defendant,”196 and warned that such 
punishment “creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards 
for the same conduct.”197 
As with the wealth of defendant and out-of-state conduct factors, 
therefore, the Court seems to be suggesting some role in the punitive 
damages analysis for “similar” conduct that harms multiple persons not 
before the court, but firmly cautions against actually punishing such 
conduct or permitting such factors to justify an otherwise excessive 
award.  In other words, State Farm may be interpreted as holding that a 
court may not actually punish a defendant for harm to others, but may 
take such harm into account in calculating a punitive damages award in 
the case of a particular plaintiff “similarly” harmed.  This may make 
some sense, but courts and juries will likely experience great confusion 
and uncertainty as they tread the fine line between “relevant” harm that 
 
 192. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1523 (2003). 
 193. Id. at 1523-24. 
 194. Id. at 1523. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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may be taken into account and the prohibition against actually punishing 
that conduct. 
Moreover, to the extent the Court has chosen to limit punishment of 
a defendant’s conduct based solely on the harm to the plaintiff, it may 
ultimately balk at setting aggregate punitive damages limitations.  If 
every mass tort punitive damages award is properly and constitutionally 
calculated to punish only the harm to a particular plaintiff, then it would 
seem every mass tort plaintiff could recover punitive damages awards 
for the same conduct – because prior plaintiffs would only have been 
awarded punitive damages based on their own harm.  Again, this may be 
a workable approach to preventing excessive aggregate punitive 
damages awards in mass tort cases, but it may also tolerate high punitive 
damages awards in each case (based on a reprehensibility analysis that 
includes “similar” harms) that in aggregate produce excessive punitive 
damages awards.  In any event, given the lower courts’ frequent 
encounters with such mass tort cases and the thorny issues such cases 
raise,198 it seems highly likely the Court will one day be forced to 
address more squarely the aggregate punishment problem and provide 
greater guidance. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The rightful function of punitive damages in punishing and 
deterring tortfeasors guilty of extraordinary wrongs has been a source of 
disagreement among American judges and legal scholars since early in 
the nineteenth century.199  The requirement that punitive damages should 
be reasonably proportional to the seriousness of a defendant’s offense is 
deeply rooted in common law torts jurisprudence.200  Recent Supreme 
Court decisions subjecting state court punitive damage awards to 
constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, have interjected a new and perplexing dimension 
to this longstanding debate. 
In applying the tenets of the modern concept of due process to the 
frequent and often large punitive damage awards imposed by state courts 
 
 198. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding identical $186,000 punitive damages awards for two plaintiffs in bedbug infested hotel, 
and recognizing likely jury calculation of damages based on the 191 rooms in the hotel); In re 
Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (imposing $4.5 billion punitive damages 
award in mandatory class action). 
 199. PROSSER & KEATON, TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). 
 200. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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today, the Court has found it necessary to create a substantial new body 
of constitutional law.201  The Court has insisted on reliable state judicial 
review processes to correct arbitrary or excessive awards, examined 
critically state courts’ justifications for imposing punitive damages, and 
announced a complicated set of standards for assessing whether the size 
of a specific punitive damage award is excessive. 
This article has sought to describe and explain the series of cases 
through which this new constitutional analysis has evolved, focusing in 
particular on the impact of the State Farm case, the Court’s most recent 
incursion into this dense thicket of punitive damage principles and 
procedures.  Although the Court obviously intended State Farm to 
clarify past ambiguities and provide practical guidance to lower courts 
considering punitive damage claims, an examination of a number of 
recent lower court cases reveal that it fell seriously short in this 
endeavor.  Moreover, State Farm raises new questions about the 
demands of due process in the context of punitive damages, and it fails 
to address several important issues left unresolved by its earlier cases.  
Even after State Farm, the Court’s application of due process norms to 
punitive damages remains very much a work in progress. 
 
 
 201. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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